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Abstract. Ecological economics is a transdisciplinary effort to link the natural and 
social sciences broadly. and especially ecology and economics, The goal is to develop a 
deeper understanding of the complex linkages between ecological and economic systems. 
and to use that understanding to develop effective policies that will lead to a world that is 
ecologically sustainable, has a fair distribution of resources (both among groups and gen-
erations of humans and between humans and other species). and efficiently allocates scarce 
resources including "natural capital." This will require new approaches that are compre-
hensive, adaptive, integrative, multi-scale, and pluralistic, and that acknowledge the huge 
uncertainties involved. Examples of integrated assessment and modeling studies at local, 
regional, and global scales are discussed as cases that both require and force the integration 
of ecology and economics and help to build common understanding of linked ecological-
economic systems. 
Key words: aggregation error; cultural vs. genetic evolution; ecological economics; ecological 
sustainability; hierarchy of scales; history of ecology; models. conceptual vs. analytic; modeling as 
a consensus-building tool; modeling complex systems; natural capital. 
ECOLOGY AND THE ECONOMY OF NATURE 
Ernst Heinrich Haeckel (1834-1919) was the first to 
use the word "oecologie," in 1866. In 1870 he pro-
duced the first full-fledged definition of "ecology": 
By ecology we mean the body of knowledge con-
cerning the economy of nature-the investigation of 
the total relations of the animal both to its inorganic 
and to its organic environment including above all. 
its friendly and inimical relations with those animals 
and plants with which it comes directly or indirectly 
into contact-in a word, ecology is the study of all 
those complex interrelations referred to by Darwin 
as the conditions of the struggle for existence. 
(Translation in Allee et al. 1949) 
Thus even in this initial definition of the field, a deep 
conceptual relationship with economics is evident. 
Ecology was, in Haeckel's words, the study ofthe econ-
omy of nature . Economics, conversely, can be thought 
of as the ecology of humans, with a particular emphasis 
on how we manage our affairs. But historically the 
science of ecology evolved out of biology and ethology 
(the science of animal behavior) and thus had very 
different intellectual roots from economics. In practical 
terms, ecology became the study of the economy of 
that part of nature that does not include humans. 
t Manuscript received 20 December 1994; revised 10 July 
1995; accepted 8 November 1995; final version received 11 
January 1996. 
2 For reprints of this group of papers, see footnote I. p. 
975. 
Since Haeckel's early definition, many other defi-
nitions of ecology emerged based on changing areas 
of interest and emphasis (Mcintosh 1985). When there 
was a focus on animal populations, ecology was "the 
study of the distribution and abundance of animals" 
(Andrewartha and Birch 1954). Later, when ecosystems 
became a major focus, ecology was "the study of the 
structure and function of ecosystems" (E. P. Odum 
1971). But what has remained at the core is the rela-
tionship of organisms to their environment. As one of 
the dominant species of animals on the planet, Homo 
sapiens and its relationship to its environment is ob-
viously well within the scope of ecology by any of its 
various definitions. 
From the very beginnings of ecology as a science 
there have been continuing attempts to incorporate hu-
mans and the social sciences. The work of H, T. Odum 
(1971), Meadows et al. (1972), Holling (1978), Walters 
(1986), and many others is certainly in this tradition. 
While these attempts have been very influential (and 
often controversial), the vast majority of ecologists 
continue to ignore humans in their day-to-day research , 
One might ask why ecologists were not persistent or 
effective enough in their attempts to extend ecological 
thinking to Homo sapiens. 
Likewise in economics and the other social sciences 
there is a history of attempts to bring the natural world 
back into the picture (Hardesty 1977, Harris 1979, Dun-
lap 1980, Boulding 1981), but the dominant tendency 
has been to consider humans to be somehow outside 
the laws and constraints that applied to other animals 
and to study humans in relative isolation from the rest 
of nature. 
978 
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This fragmentation of science into separate, isolated 
disciplines is a late 19th- and early 20th-century phe-
nomenon. Before that time there was significant inter-
action among all aspects of science, and one could say 
that science was practiced in a "transdisciplinary" way 
(Costanza et al. 1997). But by the end of the 19th 
century the trend to increasing specialization and pro-
fessionalization in science, including economics and 
the other social sciences, was well under way (Coats 
1993). 
What has come to be called the "reductionist" par-
adigm was beginning to hold sway. This paradigm as-
sumes that the world is separable into relatively iso-
lated units that can be studied and understood on their 
own, and then reassembled to give a picture of the 
whole. As the complexity of science increased, this was 
a very useful idea, since it allowed dividing up the 
problem into smaller, more manageable pieces that 
could be attacked intensively. Chemists could study 
chemistry without being distracted by other aspects of 
the systems they were studying. Also, the rapid increase 
in the sheer number of scientists who were actively 
working made it necessary to organize the work in 
some way, and the disciplinary structure seemed a log-
ical and useful way to do this. But once university 
departments were set up in the various disciplines, in-
Fernal reinforcement systems came to reward only work 
in the discipline. This rapidly led to a reduction in 
communication across disciplines and a tendency for 
the disciplines to develop their own unique languages, 
cultures, and ways of looking at the world. Disciplinary 
speciation through isolation had begun to occur. 
In economics, this led to a growing isolation from 
the natural resource (or land) component of the clas-
sical triad of land, labor, and capital, and with it a 
growing isolation from the natural sciences. Economics 
departments began to reward theory more highly than 
applications, and the discipline as a whole attempted 
to pattern itself on physics, which was arguably the 
most successful example of the advantages of the dis-
ciplinary model of organization. 
This trend continued in the early through middle 20th 
century and, by the time of the renewed environmental 
awareness of the 1970s, economics had become highly 
specialized and abstracted away from its earlier con-
nections with the natural environment. Textbooks at 
the time barely mentioned the environment and con-
centrated instead on the microeconomics of supply, de-
mand, and price formation and the macroeconomics of 
growth in manufactured capital and gross national 
product (GNP). 
At the same time, economics was becoming absorbed 
with professionalization. As A. W. Coats (1993 :27) not-
ed: 
At least since the marginal revolution of the 1870's, 
mainstream economists have sought to enhance their 
intellectual authority and autonomy by excluding 
certain questions which were either sensitive (such 
as the distribution of income and wealth, and the 
role of economic power in society) or incapable of 
being handled by their preferred methods and tech-
niques, or both. These are precisely the questions 
which are emphasized by their professional and lay 
critics and, more recently, by many economists who 
cannot be dismissed by their professional colleagues 
as either ignorant or incompetent. 
The story in ecology was somewhat different. As we 
have previously noted, ecology is a much younger sci-
ence, and it has always been more explicitly pluralistic 
and interdisciplinary. But its roots were in biology and 
the trend in biology was much the same as in other 
areas of science. The initial split into botany and zo-
ology was followed by further specialization into bio-
chemistry, biophysics, molecular biology, etc. In ecol-
ogy itself there was something of a split between the 
population ecologists (e.g., Robert MacArthur) who 
concentrated on individual populations of organisms, 
and systems ecologists (e.g., E. P. and H. T. Odum) 
who focused on whole ecosystems. But this split never 
got to the point of separation into distinct departments 
and diSCiplines, although many academic programs 
took on a decided flavor in one direction or the other. 
Through all of this, ecologists, more so than any 
other diSCipline, have maintained communication 
across most of the natural sciences. To study ecosys-
tems, one has to integrate hydrology, soil science, ge-
ology, climatology, chemistry, botany, zoology, ge-
netics, and many other disciplines. The dividing line 
for many ecologists has been at a particular species, 
Homo sapiens. Even though Haeckel's original defi-
nition at least implicitly included humans, and many 
ecologists over the years have argued and worked to 
make this integration operational, for the vast majority 
of active ecologists the study of humans is outside their 
discipline, left to the social sciences. Indeed, most ecol-
ogists have looked for field sites as remote from human 
activities as possible to conduct their research. 
As Mcintosh (1985:319) points out: 
If human factors are beyond ecological considera-
tion, what, then is human ecology? It is not clear 
whether ecology will expand to encompass the social 
sciences and develop as a meta science of ecology. 
The alternative is a more effective interdisciplinary 
relationship between ecology and the several social 
sciences. 
Ecological economics can be seen as an attempt to 
build this more effective interdisciplinary relationship 
as a bridge to a truly comprehensive science of humans 
as a component of nature that will fulfill the early goals 
of ecology. It is an attempt to help rectify the tendency 
to ignore humans in ecology, while at the same time 
rectifying the parallel tendency to ignore the natural 
world in the social sciences. 
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REINTEGRATING ECOLOGY AND 
ECONOMICS FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
Ecology and economics have been separate disci-
plines throughout their recent histories in the 20th cen-
tury. While each has certainly borrowed theoretical 
concepts from the other and shared patterns of thinking 
from the other sciences, they have addressed separate 
issues, utilized different assumptions to reach answers, 
and supported different interests in the policy process. 
Recognition of the importance of bringing these do-
mains of thought together and attempting to reintegrate 
the natural and social sciences has lead to what we 
have been calling "ecological economics." After nu-
merous experiments with joint meetings between econ-
omists and ecologists, the International Society for 
Ecological Economics (lSEE) was formed in 1988, the 
journal Ecological Economics was initiated and pub-
lished its first issue in February of 1989 (currently pub-
lishing 12 issues per year), and major international con-
ferences of ecologists and economists have been held 
ever since. Several ecological-economics institutes 
have been formed around the world, and a significant 
number of books have appeared with the term "eco-
logical economics" in their titles (e.g., Martinez-Alier 
1987, Costanza 1991, Peet 1992, Barbier et al. 1994, 
Jansson et al. 1994, Krishnan et al. 1995). 
Ecological economics is not a single new paradigm 
based in shared assumptions and theory. It represents 
a commitment among economists, ecologists, and other 
academics and practitioners to learn from each other, 
to explore new patterns of thinking together, and to 
facilitate the derivation and implementation of new 
economic and environmental policies. To date, ecolog-
ical economics has been deliberately conceptually plu-
ralistic even while particular members may prefer one 
paradigm over another (Norgaard 1989). 
To achieve sustainability, the global community must 
deal with new types of problems threatening the future 
well-being and existence of Homo sapiens. These prob-
lems are fundamentally cross-scale, transcultural, and 
transdisciplinary, calling for innovative research ap-
proaches and new social institutions (Costanza and 
Daly 1987, Common and Perrings 1992, Berkes and 
Folke 1994, d' Arge 1994, Holling 1994). This research 
needs to be integrated with rather than divorced from 
the policy and management process (Golley 1994, 
Viederman 1994). Ecological economics addresses the 
relationships between ecosystems and economic sys-
tems in the broadest sense, in order to develop a deep 
understanding of the entire system of humans and na-
ture as a basis for effective policies for sustainability 
(Costanza et al. 1991). It takes a holistic "systems" 
approach that goes beyond the normal boundaries of 
the academic disciplines. This does not imply that dis-
ciplinary approaches are rejected, or that the purpose 
is to create a new discipline. Ecological economics is 
interdisciplinary in the sense that scholars from various 
disciplines collaborate side by side using their own 
tools and techniques, and transdisciplinary in the sense 
that new theory, tools, and techniques are developed 
out of the dialogue to effectively deal with sustaina-
bility. It focuses more directly on the problems facing 
Homo sapiens and the ecosystems on which we depend 
in the longer term. These problems involve: 
1) assessing and ensuring that the scale of human 
activities within the biosphere is ecologically sustain-
able; 
2) distributing resources and property rights fairly, 
both within the current generation of humans and be-
tween this and future generations, and also between 
humans and other species; and 
3) efficiently allocating resources as constrained and 
defined by (I) and (2) above, and including both mar-
keted and non-marketed resources, especially ecosys-
tems. 
Humans have a special role to play because we are 
responsible for understanding our OW;l role in the larger 
system and managing it for sustainability (Costanza et 
al. 1991). This responsibility is not only an ethical and 
a moral issue. Sustaining the environment means sav-
ing ourselves, including future generations, since we 
are dependent on healthy ecosystems for survival. 
Thus, ecological economics is an anthropocentric field 
of study in the sense that it is concerned about the 
survival and well-being of Homo sapiens on this planet. 
It is at the same time biocentric in the sense that it is 
concerned about the survival and well-being of all other 
life as well (Rapport 1993). 
Ecological economics views the socioeconomic sys-
tem as a part of the overall ecosphere, emphasizing 
carrying capacity and scale issues in relation to the 
growth of the human population and its activities, and 
the development of fair systems of property rights and 
wealth distribution. 
Uncertainty is recognized as a fundamental charac-
teristic of complex systems, and particular processes 
in nature are essentially irreversible (Costanza and 
Cornwell 1992, Ludwig et al. 1993, Clark and Munro 
1994, Costanza 1994). Instead of locking ourselves into 
development paths that may ultimately lead to ecolog-
ical collapse, we need to conserve and invest in natural 
capital (Costanza and Daly 1992), in the sense of keep-
ing our ecological life-support systems and interrelated 
socioeconomic systems resilient to change (Hammer et 
al. 1993, Holling 1994, Jansson and Jansson 1994, Per-
rings 1994). Hence, ecological economics has an ex-
plicit concern for future generations and long-term sus-
tainability, and works with a broader range of values 
than the limited perceptions of the current generation 
of humans (although these perceptions are certainly not 
ignored). Ethics and equity issues are explored, as well 
as differences and similarities between worldviews and 
cultures (Berkes and Folke 1994, Turner et al. 1994). 
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INTEGRATED ECOLOGICAL-ECONOMIC 
MODELING 
One key research area in ecological economics is 
understanding and modeling the dynamics of linked 
ecological and economic systems, ranging in size from 
the biosphere as a whole to regional landscapes to local 
systems. Integrated ecological-economic systems have 
so far received only very limited direct scientific at-
tention . Several current approaches may be relevant to 
this problem, and a cooperative synthesis among ecol-
ogists, economists, mathematicians, computer scien-
tists, and many others is essential. I briefly describe 
general issues of scale and hierarchy in modeling in-
tegrated ecological-economic systems along with some 
ongoing case studies that attempt to implement this 
approach. 
New understanding about system dynamics and pre-
dictability that has emerged from the study of "com-
plex systems" is creating new tools for modeling in-
teractions between human and natural systems. A range 
of techniques has become available through advances 
in computer speed and accessibility, and by imple-
menting a broad, interdisciplinary systems view. 
"Systems" are groups of interacting, interdependent 
parts linked together by exchanges of energy, matter, 
and information. "Complex systems" are characterized 
'by: (I) strong (usually nonlinear) interactions among 
the parts; (2) complex feedback loops that make it dif-
ficult to distinguish cause from effect; (3) significant 
time and space lags; discontinuities, thresholds and 
limits; all resulting in (4) the inability to simply "add-
up" or aggregate small-scale behavior to arrive at 
large-scale results (von Bertalanffy 1968, Rastetter et 
al. 1992). Ecological and economic systems both in-
dependently exhibit these characteristics of complex 
systems. Taken together, linked ecological-economic 
systems are devilishly complex. 
While almost any subdivision of the universe can be 
thought of as a " system," modelers of systems usually 
look for boundaries that minimize the interaction be-
tween the system under study and the rest of the uni-
verse in order to make their job easier. The interactions 
between ecological and economic systems are many 
and strong. So, while splitting the world into separate 
economic and ecological systems is possible, it does 
not minimize interactions and is a poor choice of 
boundary. 
Classical (or reductionist) scientific disciplines tend 
to dissect their subject into smaller and smaller isolated 
parts in an effort to reduce the problem to its essential 
elements. In order to allow the dissection of system 
components, it must be assumed that interactions and 
feedbacks between system elements are negligible or 
that the links are essentially linear so they can be added 
up to give the behavior of the whole (von Bertalanffy 
1968). Complex systems violate the assumptions of 
reductionist techniques and therefore are not well un-
derstood using the perspective of classical science. In 
contrast, "systems analysis" is the scientific method 
applied across many disciplines, scales, resolutions, 
and system types in an integrative manner. 
In economics, for example, a typical distinction is 
made between partial equilibrium analysis and general 
equilibrium analysis. In partial equilibrium analysis, a 
subsystem (a single market) is studied with the under-
lying assumption that there are no important feedback 
loops from other markets. In general equilibrium anal-
ysis, on the other hand, the totality of markets is studied 
in order to bring out the general interdependence in the 
economy. The large-scale, whole-economy, general 
equilibrium effects are usually quite different from the 
sum of the constituent small-scale, partial equilibrium 
effects. Add to this the further complication that in 
reality "equilibrium" is never achieved, and one can 
begin to see the limitations of classical, reductionist 
science in understanding complex systems. 
Economic and ecological analysis needs to shift 
away from implicit assumptions that eliminate links 
within and between economic and natural systems, be-
cause, due to the strength of the real-world interactions 
among these components, failing to link them can cause 
severe misperceptions and indeed policy failures (Cos-
tanza 1987). Since reductionist thinking fails in the 
quest to understand complex systems, new concepts 
and methods must be devised. 
To achieve a comprehensive understanding that is 
useful for modeling and prediction of linked ecologi-
cal-economic systems requires the synthesis and in-
tegration of several different conceptual frames (Nor-
gaard 1989). As Levins (1966) has described this search 
for robustness : 
we attempt to treat the same problem with several 
alternative models each with different simplifications 
. . . Then, if these models, despite their different as-
sumptions, lead to similar results we have what we 
call a robust theorem which is relatively free of the 
details of the model. Hence our truth is the inter-
section of independent lies. 
Existing modeling approaches can be classified ac-
cording to a number of criteria, including scale, reso-
lution, generality, realism, and precision. The most use-
ful approach within this spectrum of characteristics de-
pends on the specific goals of the modeling exercise. 
I next describe a few examples of how one might match 
model characteristics with several of the possible mod-
eling goals relevant for ecological economic systems. 
A better appreciation of the range of possible model 
characteristics and goals can help to more optimally 
match characteristics and goals. 
Analysis of complex systems offers great potential 
for generating insights into the behavior of linked eco-
logical-economic systems. These insights will be need-
ed to change the behavior of the human population 
towards a sustainable pattern, a pattern that works in 
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synergy with the life-supporting ecosystems on which 
it depends. The next step in the evolution of ecological 
economic models is to fully integrate the two fields and 
not just transfer methods between them. Clark's (1976, 
1981, 1985) bioeconomics work was the start of this 
recognition. of the importance of linking the mutually 
interacting sub-parts. But much work remains to be 
done to bring the two fields and the technology that 
supports them to the point where their models can ad-
equately interact. Transdisciplinary collaboration and 
cooperative synthesis among natural and social sci-
entists and others will be essential (Norgaard 1989). 
Purposes of models 
Models are analogous to maps. Like maps, they have 
many possible purposes and uses and no one map or 
model is right for the entire range of uses (Levins 1966, 
Robinson 1991). It is inappropriate to think of models 
or maps as anything but crude (but in many cases ab-
solutely essential) abstract representations of complex 
territory, whose usefulness can best be judged by their 
ability to help solve the navigational problems faced. 
Models are essential for policy evaluation, but are often 
also misused since there is " . .. the tendency to use 
such models as a means of legitimizing rather than 
informing policy decisions. By cloaking a policy de-
cision in the ostensibly neutral aura of scientific fore-
casting, policy-makers can deflect attention from the 
normative nature of that decision . .. " (Robinson 
1992). 
In the case of modeling ecological economic sys-
tems, purposes can range from developing simple con-
ceptual models, in order to provide a general under-
standing of system behavior, to detailed realistic ap-
plications aimed at evaluating specific policy propos-
als. It is inappropriate to judge this whole range of 
models by the same criteria. At a minimum, the three 
criteria of realism (simulating system behavior in a 
qualitatively realistic way), precision (simulating be-
havior in a quantitatively precise way), and generality 
(representing a broad range of systems' behaviors with 
the same model) are necessary. Holling (1964) first 
described the fundamental trade-offs in modeling 
among these three criteria. Later Holling (1966) and 
Levins (1966) expanded and further applied this clas-
sification. No single model can maximize all three of 
these goals, and the choice of which objectives to pur-
sue depends on the fundamental purposes of the model. 
Several examples in the literature of ecological and 
economic models demonstrate the various ways in 
which trade-offs are made between realism, precision, 
and generality. 
High-generality conceptual models.-In striving for 
generality, models must give up some realism and/or 
precision. They can do this by simplifying relationships 
and/or reducing resolution. Simple linear and nonlinear 
economic and ecological models tend to have high gen-
erality but low realism and low precision (Clark and 
Munro 1975, Brown and Swierzbinski 1985, Kaitala 
and Pohjola 1988, Lines 1989, 1990). Examples in-
clude Holling's "4-box" model (Holling 1987), the 
"ecological economy" modeJ of Brown and Rough-
garden (1992), most conceptual macroeconomic mod-
els (Keynes 1936, Lucas 1975), economic-growth mod-
els (Solow 1956), and the "evolutionary games" ap-
proach. For example, the "ecological economy" model 
of Brown and Roughgarden (1992) contains only three 
state variables (labor, capital, and "natural resources") 
and the relationships among these variables are highly 
idealized. But the purpose of the model was not high 
realism or precision, but rather to address some basic, 
general questions about the limits of economic systems 
in the context of their dependence on an ecological 
life-support base. 
A different trade-off is achieved in the General Eco-
system Model (GEM) developed by Fitz et al. (1996). 
This model is intended to be applicable to a whole 
range of ecosystems and scales, while maintaining a 
fairly high degree of complexity (20 state variables) 
and the ability to be used as a module in 'spatially 
explicit landscape models (discussed below). Here, 
some generality is exchanged for increased realism and 
precision. 
High-precision analytical models.-Often, one 
wants high precision (quantitative correspondence be-
tween data and model) and is willing to sacrifice re-
alism and generality. One strategy here is to keep res-
olution high, but to simplify relationships and deal with 
short time frames. Some models strive to strike a bal-
ance between mechanistic small-scale models that trace 
small fluctuations in a system and more general whole-
system approaches that remove some of the noise from 
the signal but do not allow the modeler to trace the 
source of system changes. The alternative some ecol-
ogists have devised is to identify one or a few properties 
that characterize the system as a whole (Wulff and 
Ulanowicz 1989). For example, Hannon and Ioiris 
(1987) used an economic input-output model to ex-
amine relationships between biotic and abiotic stocks 
in a marine ecosystem and found that this method al-
lowed them to show the direct and indirect connection 
of any species to any other and to the external envi-
ronment in this system at high precision (but low gen-
erality and realism). Also using input-output tech-
niques, Duchin's (1988, 1992) aim was to direct de-
velopment of industrial production systems to efficient-
ly reduce and recycle waste, in the manner of ecological 
systems. Large econometric models (Klein 1971) used 
for predicting short-run behavior of the economy be-
long to this class of models since they are constructed 
to fit existing data as closely as possible (at the sacrifice 
of generality and realism). 
High-realism impact-analysis models.-When the 
goal is to develop realistic assessments of the behavior 
of specific complex systems, generality and precision 
must be relaxed. High-realism models are concerned 
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with accurately representing the underlying processes 
in a specific system, rather than precisely matching 
quantitative behavior or being generally applicable. 
Dynamic, nonlinear, evolutionary systems models at 
moderate to high resolution generally fall into this cat-
egory. Coastal physical-biological-chemical models 
(Wroblewski and Hofmann 1989), which are used to 
investigate nutrient fluxes and contain large amounts 
of site-specific data, fall into this category, as do micro 
models of behavior of particular business activities . 
Another example is Costanza et al.'s (1990) model of 
coastal landscape dynamics that included high spatial 
and temporal resolution and complex, nonlinear, pro-
cess dynamics. This model divided a coastal landscape 
into l-km2 cells, each of which contained a process-
based, dynamic, ecological simulation model. Flows of 
water, sediments, nutrients, and biomass from cell to 
cell across the landscape were linked with internal eco-
system dynamics to simulate long-term successional 
processes and responses to various human impacts in 
a very realistic way. But the model was very site-spe-
cific and of only moderate numerical precision. 
Further extensions of this general approach in the 
Everglades (H. C. Fitz, R. Costanza, and E. Reyes; 
unpublished report [1993; The Everglades Model, Task 
2 Summary] to the South Florida Water Management 
District, West Palm Beach Florida, USA) and the Pa-
tuxent River Basin in Maryland (Bockstael et al. 1995) 
have demonstrated the utility of simulating the spatially 
explicit evolution of complex regional ecological sys-
tems using a landscape perspective. Economic com-
ponents are being developed for the Patuxent model to 
reflect human behavior and economic influences (Bock-
stael et al. 1995). The effects of human intervention 
result directly from the conversion of land from one 
use to another (e.g., wetlands conversion, residential 
development, power-plant siting) or from changes in 
the practices that take place within specific land uses 
(e.g., adoption of agricultural best management prac-
tices, intensification of congestion and automobile 
emissions, change in urban water and sewer use, and 
storm runoff). Integrated regional models that can ad-
dress the interactions between humans and the envi-
ronment with a fairly high degree of realism are be-
coming quite popular (Groffman and Likens 1994). To 
address these impacts in a realistic way, which is es-
sential for many policy purposes, generality and pre-
cision must be relaxed. 
Moderate-generality and moderate-precision indi-
cator models.-In many types of systems modeling, 
the desired outcome is to accurately determine the over-
all magnitude and direction of change, trading off re-
alism for some moderate amount of generality and pre-
cision. For example, aggregate measures of system per-
formance such as standard GNp, environmentally ad-
justed net national product (or "green NNP") that 
includes environmental costs (Maler 1991), and indi-
cators of ecosystem health (Costanza et al. 1992) fit 
into this category. The microcosm systems employed 
by Taub (1989) allow some standardization for testing 
ecosystem responses and developing ecosystem-per-
formance indices. Taub (1987) notes, however, that 
many existing indicators of change in ecosystems are 
based on implicit ecological assumptions that have not 
been critically tested, either for their generality, real-
ism, or precision. 
Complex systems, scale, and hierarchy 
In modeling complex systems, the issues of scale 
and hierarchy are central (O'Neill et al. 1989, Holling 
1992). Some claim that the natural world, the human 
species included, contains a convenient hierarchy of 
scales based on interaction-minimizing boundaries~ 
scales ranging from atoms to molecules to cells to or-
gans to organisms to populations to communities to 
ecosystems (including economic, and/or human-dom-
inated ecosystems) to bioregions to the global system 
and beyond (Allan and Starr 1982, 0 ' Neill et al. 1986). 
By studying the similarities of and differences between 
different kinds of systems at different scales and res-
olutions, one might develop hypotheses and test them 
against other systems to explore their degree of gen-
erality and predictability. 
The term "scale" in this context refers to both the 
resolution (spatial grain size, time step, or degree of 
complication of the model) and the extent (in time, 
space, and number of components modeled) of the anal-
ysis. The process of "scaling" refers to the application 
of information or models developed at one scale to 
problems at other scales. In both ecology and econom-
ics, primary information and measurements are gen-
erally collected at relatively small scales (e.g., small 
plots in ecology, individuals or single firms in eco-
nomics) and that information is then often used to build 
models at radically different scales (e.g., regional, na-
tional, or global). The process of scaling is directly tied 
to the problem of aggregation, (the process of adding 
or otherwise combining components) which in com-
plex, nonlinear, discontinuous systems (like ecological 
and economic systems) is far from a trivial problem 
(O'Neill and Rust 1979, Rastetter et al. 1992). 
For example, in applied economics, basic data sets 
are usually derived from the national accounts, which 
contain data that are linearly aggregated over individ-
uals, companies, or organizations. Sonnenschein 
(1974) and Debreu (1974) have shown that, unless one 
makes very strong and unrealistic assumptions about 
the individual units, the aggregate (large-scale) rela-
tions between variables have no resemblance to the 
corresponding relations on the smaller scale. 
Rastetter et al. (1992) describe and compare three 
basic methods for scaling that are applicable to com-
plex systems. All of their methods are attempts to uti-
lize information about the nonlinear small-scale vari-
ability in the large-scale models. They list three meth-
ods: (1) partial transformations of the fine-scale math-
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ematical relationships to coarse-scale using a 
statistical-expectations operator that incorporates the 
fine-scale variability; (2) partitioning or subdividing 
the system into smaller, more homogeneous parts (i.e., 
spatially explicit modeling); and (3) calibration of the 
fine-scale relationships to coarse-scale data, when this 
data is available. They go on to suggest a combination 
of these methods as the most effective overall method 
of scaling in complex systems. 
A primary reason for aggregation error in scaling 
complex systems is the nonlinear variability in the fine-
scale phenomenon. For example, Rastetter et al. (1992) 
give a detailed example of scaling a relationship for 
i ndi vidual leaf photosynthesis as a function of radiation 
and leaf efficiency to estimate the productivity of the 
entire forest canopy. Because of nonlinear variability 
in the way individual leaves process light energy, one 
cannot simply use the fine-scale relationships among 
photosynthesis, radiation, and efficiency along with the 
average values for the entire forest to get total forest 
productivity without introducing significant aggrega-
tion error. One must somehow understand and incor-
porate this nonlinear fine-scale variability into the 
coarse-scale equations using some combination of the 
three methods mentioned above. Method 1 (statistical 
expectations) implies deriving new coarse-scale equa-
tions that incorporate the fine-scale variability. The 
problem is that incorporation of this variability often 
leads to equations that are extremely complex and cum-
bersome (Rastetter et al. 1992). Method 2 (partitioning) 
implies subdividing the forest into many relatively 
more homogeneous levels or zones and applying the 
basic fine-scale equations for each partition. This re-
quires a method for adjusting the parameters for each 
partition, a choice of the number of partitions (the res-
olution), and an understanding of the effects of the 
choice of resolution and parameters on the results. Both 
spatially explicit models and individual-based models 
are examples of this method. Method 3 (recalibration) 
implies simply recalibrating the fine-scale equations to 
coarse-scale data. It presupposes that coarse-scale data 
are available (as more than simply the aggregation of 
fine-scale data). In many important cases, however, this 
coarse-scale data is either extremely limited or is not 
available. Thus, while a judicious application of all 
three aggregation methods is necessary, from the per-
spective of complex systems modeling, the partitioning 
approach (Method 2) seems to hold particular promise, 
because it can take fullest advantage of emerging com-
puter technologies and data bases. 
From the scaling perspective, hierarchy theory is a 
potentially useful tool for partitioning systems in ways 
that minimize aggregation error. According to hierar-
chy theory, nature can be partitioned into "naturally 
occurring" levels that share similar time and space 
scales, and that interact with higher and lower levels 
in systematic ways. Each level in the hierarchy sees 
the higher levels as constraints and the lower levels as 
noise. For example, individual organisms see the eco-
system they inhabit as a slowly changing set of con-
straints and the operation of their component cells and 
organs is what matters most to them. However, Norton 
and U1anowicz (1992) suggest that what appears to be 
"noise" at a lower level could be turned into significant 
perturbations on the higher level. This can happen 
when a critical mass of components participate in a 
"trend," a behavioral pattern that affects the slower 
processes at the higher level. The rapid and extensive 
human uses of fossil fuels could be seen as such a trend, 
causing perturbations at the global atmospheric level, 
which might feed back and radically alter the frame-
work of action at the lower level. 
Shugart (1989) explains the relationship between 
scales: 
Clearly, natural patterns in environmental con-
straints contribute substantially to the spatial pattern 
and temporal dynamics of particular ecosystems . .. 
these patterns, especially temporal ones, may reso-
nate with natural frequencies of plant growth forms 
(i.e., phenology and longevity) to amplify environ-
mental patterns. The simplifying assumptions of hi-
erarchy theory may ease the problem of scaling by 
providing a common (but somewhat generalized) set 
of rules that could be applied at any scale in the 
hierarchy. 
To test some of these ideas, we have recently estab-
lished a Multiscale Experimental Ecosystem Research 
Center (MEERC) at the University of Maryland. This 
Center will construct a series of "cosms" at several 
time, space, and complexity scales and carry out an 
integrated experimental and modeling research pro-
gram aimed at understanding and modeling ecosystems 
at each of these scales (from microcosms to mesocosms 
to small and large regional watersheds [macrocosms]). 
MEERC is focused on assessing the response of these 
systems to nutrient and toxicant perturbations, and how 
(and why) these responses change with scale. The ul-
timate goal is to develop and test a set of performance 
(health) indicators for these systems, and to develop 
and test a set of scaling principles that will allow the 
extrapolation of results across scales. Detailed, dynam-
ic simulation models of all the experimental systems 
will be developed and the program's experimental de-
sign will allow the models to be rigorously tested and 
calibrated. 
Evolutionary approaches 
In modeling the dynamics of complex systems it is 
impossi ble to ignore the discontinuities and surprises 
that often characterize these systems and the fact that 
they operate far from equilibrium in a state of constant 
adaptation to changing conditions (Lines 1990, Holland 
and Miller 1991, Kay 1991, Rosser 1991, 1992). The 
paradigm of evolution has been broadly applied to both 
ecological and economic systems (Boulding 1981, Ar-
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thur 1988, Lindgren 1991, Maxwell and Costanza 
1993) as a way of formalizing understanding of ad-
aptation and learning behaviors in non-equilibrium dy-
namic complex systems. The general evolutionary par-
adigm posits a mechanism for adaptation and learning 
in complex systems at any scale using three basic in-
teracting processes: (1) information storage and trans-
mission; (2) generation of new alternatives ; and (3) 
selection of superior alternatives according to some 
performance criteria. 
The evolutionary paradigm is different from the con-
ventional optimization paradigm popular in economics 
in at least four important respects (Arthur 1988): (1) 
evolution is path dependent, meaning that the detailed 
history and dynamics of the system are important; (2) 
evolution can achieve multiple equilibria; (3) there is 
no guarantee that optimal efficiency or any other op-
timal performance will be achieved, due in part to path 
dependence and sensitivity to perturbations; and (4) 
"lock-in" (survival of the first rather than survival of 
the fittest) is possible under conditions of increasing 
returns. While, as Arthur (1988) notes, "conventional 
economic theory is built largely on the assumption of 
diminishing returns on the margin (local negative feed-
backs)," life itself can be characterized as a positive 
feedback, self-reinforcing, autocatalytic process (Kay 
1991, Gunther and Folke 1993) and we should expect 
increasing returns, lock-in, path dependence, multiple 
equilibria, and sub-optimal efficiency to be the rule 
rather than the exception in economic and ecological 
systems. 
Cultural vs. genetic evolution.-In biological evo-
lution, the information-storage medium is the genes, 
the generation of new alternatives is by sexual recom-
bination or genetic mutation, and selection is per-
formed by nature according to a criteria of "fitness" 
based on reproductive success. The same process of 
change occurs in ecological, economic, and cultural 
systems, but the elements on which the process works 
are different (Boyd and Richardson 1985). For exam-
ple, in cultural evolution: (1) the storage medium is 
the culture-the oral tradition, books, film, or other 
storage media for passing on behavioral norms and 
belief systems; (2) the generation of new alternatives 
is through innovation by individual members or groups 
in the culture; and (3) selection is again based on the 
reproductive success of the alternatives generated, but 
reproduction is carried out by the spread and copying 
of the behavior or ideas through learning and imitation 
rather than biological reproduction . One may also talk 
of "economic" evolution, a subset of cultural evolution 
dealing with the generation, storage, and selection of 
alternative ways of producing things and allocating that 
which is produced. The field of "evolutionary eco-
nomics" has grown up in the last decade or so based 
on these ideas (cf. Day and Groves 1975, Day 1989). 
Evolutionary theories in economics have already been 
successfully applied to problems of technical change, 
to the development of new institutions, and to the evo-
lution of means of payment. 
For large, slow-growing animals like humans, ge-
netic evolution has a built-in bias towards the long run. 
Changing the genetic structure of a species requires 
that characteristics (phenotypes) be selected and ac-
cumulated by differential reproductive success . Be-
haviors learned or acquired during the lifetime of an 
individual cannot be passed on genetically. Genetic 
evolution is therefore usually a relatively slow process 
requiring many generations to significantly alter a spe-
cies' physical and biological characteristics. 
Cultural evolution is potentially much faster. Tech-
nical change is perhaps the most important and fastest 
evolving cultural process. Learned behaviors that are 
successful, at least in the short term, can be almost 
immediately spread to other members of the culture 
and passed on in the oral, written, or video record. The 
increased speed of adaptation that this process allows 
has been largely responsible for Homo sapiens' amaz-
ing success at appropriating the resources of the planet. 
Vitousek et al. (1986) estimate that humans now di-
rectly control from 25 to 40% of the total primary 
production of the planet's biosphere, and this is begin-
ning to have significant effects on the biosphere, in-
cluding changes in global climate and in the planet's 
protective ozone shield. 
Thus, the costs of this rapid cultural evolution are 
potentially significant. Like a car that has increased 
speed, humans are in more danger of running off the 
road or over a cliff. Cultural evolution lacks the built-in 
long-run bias of genetic evolution and is susceptible 
to being led by its hyper-efficient short-run adaptability 
over a cliff into the abyss. 
Another major difference between cultural and ge-
netic evolution may serve as a countervailing bias, 
however. As Arrow (1962) has pointed out, cultural 
and economic evolution, unlike genetic evolution, can 
at least to some extent employ foresight. If society can 
see the cliff, perhaps it can be avoided. 
While market forces drive adaptive mechanisms 
(Kaitala and Pohjola 1988), the systems that evolve are 
not necessarily optimal, so the question remains : What 
external influences are needed and when should they 
be applied in order to achieve an optimum economic 
system via evolutionary adaptation? The challenge 
faced by ecological economic systems modelers is to 
first apply the models to gain foresight, and then to 
respond to and manage the system feedbacks in a way 
that helps avoid any foreseen cliffs (Berkes and Folke 
1994). Devising policy instruments and identifying in-
centives that can translate this foresight into effective 
modifications of the short-run evolutionary dynamics 
is the challenge (Costanza 1987). 
Evolutionary criteria.-A critical problem in apply-
ing the evolutionary paradigm in dynamic models is 
defining the selection criteria a priori. In its basic form 
the theory of evolution is circular and descriptive 
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(Holling 1987). Those species or cultural institutions 
or economic activities survive that are the most suc-
cessful at reproducing themselves. But we only know 
which ones were more successful after the fact. To use 
the evolutionary paradigm in modeling, we require a 
quantitative measure of fitness (or more generally per-
formance) in order to drive the selection process. 
Several candidates have been proposed for this func-
tion in various systems, ranging from expected eco-
nomic utility to thermodynamic potential. Thermody-
namic potential is interesting as a performance criterion 
in complex systems because even very simple chemical 
systems can be seen to evolve complex non-equilibrium 
structures using this criterion (Prigogine 1972, Nicolis 
and Prigogine 1977, 1989), and all systems are (at min-
imum) thermodynamic systems (in addition to their 
other characteristics) so that thermodynamic con-
straints and principles are applicable across both eco-
logical and economic systems (Eriksson 1991). 
This application of the evolutionary paradigm to 
thermodynamic systems has led to the development of 
far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics and the concept 
of "dissipative structures" (Prigogine 1972). An im-
portant research question is to determine the range of 
applicability of these principles and their appropriate 
use in modeling ecological economic systems. 
Many dissipative structures follow complicated tran-
sient motions. Schneider and Kay (1994) propose a way 
to analyze these chaotic behaviors and note that, 
"Away from equilibrium, highly ordered stable com-
plex systems can emerge, develop and grow at the ex-
pense of more disorder at higher levels in the system's 
hierarchy." It has been suggested that the integrity of 
far-from-equilibrium systems has to do with the ability 
of the system to attain and maintain its (set of) optimum 
operating point(s) (Kay 1991). The optimum operating 
point(s) reflect a state where self-organizing thermo-
dynamic forces and disorganizing forces of environ-
mental change are balanced. This idea has been elab-
orated and described as "evolution at the edge of cha-
os" by Bak and Chen (1991) and Kauffman and John-
son (1991). 
The concept that a system may evolve through a 
sequence of stable and unstable stages leading to the 
formation of new structures seems well suited to eco-
logical economic systems. For example, Gallopin 
(1989) stresses that to understand the processes of eco-
nomic impoverishment" . .. The focus must necessar-
ily shift from the static concept of poverty to the dy-
namic processes of impoverishment and sustainable de-
velopment within a context of permanent change. The 
dimensions of poverty cannot any longer be reduced 
to only the economic or material conditions of living; 
the capacity to respond to changes, and the vulnera-
bility of the social groups and ecological systems to 
change become central." In a similar fashion Robinson 
(1991) argues that sustainability calls for maintenance 
of the dynamic capacity to respond adaptively, which 
implies that we should focus more on basic natural and 
social processes, than on the particular forms these pro-
cesses take at any time. Berkes and Folke (1994) have 
discussed the capacity to respond to changes in eco-
logical economic systems in terms of institution build-
ing, collective actions, cooperation, and social learn-
ing. These might be some of the ways to enhance the 
capacity for resilience (increase the capacity to recover 
from disturbance) in interconnected ecological- eco-
nomic systems. 
INTEGRA TED MODELING AS A 
CONSENSus-BUILDING TOOL IN 
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
It is not enough for groups of academic "experts" 
to build integrated models. What is required is a new 
role for modeling as a tool in building a broad con-
sensus not only across academic disciplines, but also 
between science and policy. More broadly, this process 
of stakeholder involvement is a key one to achieving 
sustainability. Ethicist John Rawls (Rawls 1971, 1987) 
has argued persuasively that policies that represent an 
"overlapping consensus" of the interest groups in-
volved in a problem will be fair, and this will result in 
their also being effective and resilient. Thus, solutions 
to the problems of sustainability will only be robust 
(resilient) and effective if they are fair and equitable 
(the fair distribution criterion mentioned earlier) to all 
of the interest groups involved, including future gen-
erations and other species. 
Integrated modeling of large regional systems, from 
watersheds to continental-scale systems and ultimately 
to the global scale, requires input from a very broad 
range of people. We need to see the modeling process 
as one that involves not only the technical aspects, but 
also the sociological aspects involved with using the 
process to help build consensus about the way the sys-
tem works and which management options are most 
effective. This consensus needs to extend both across 
the gulf separating the relevant academic disciplines 
and across the even broader gulf separating the science 
and policy communities and the pUblic. Appropriately 
designed and appropriately used integrated ecological-
economic modeling exercises can help to bridge these 
gulfs. 
The process of modeling can (and must) also serve 
this consensus-building function. It can help to build 
mutual understanding, solicit input from a broad range 
of stakeholder groups, and maintain a substantive di-
alogue between members of these groups. In the pro-
cess of adaptive management, integrated modeling and 
consensus building are essential components (Gunder-
son et at 1995). 
The potential to use modeling as a way to build 
consensus has been greatly expanded in recent years 
by the advent of new, much easier-to-use computers 
and modeling software. As just one example, it is now 
possible, with graphic, icon-based modeling software 
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packages (such as STELLA from High Performance 
Systems, Inc, Hannover, New Hampshire, USA) to in-
volve a group of relative modeling novices in the con-
struction of relatively complex models, with a few peo-
ple competent in modeling acting as facilitators . STEL-
LA uses the simple basic model components of stocks, 
flows, auxiliary variables, and functional connections . 
The graphic representations of these units are con-
nected and manipulated on the screen to build the basic 
structure of the model. This process can be transparent 
to a group when the computer screen in projected onto 
the wall. Participants can then both follow the model 
construction process and contribute their knowledge to 
the process . After the basic model structure is devel-
oped, the program requires more detailed decisions 
about the functional connections between variables. 
This process is also transparent to the group, using 
well-designed dialogue boxes, and the potential for 
both graphic and algebraic input. Once preliminary ver-
sions of the model have been constructed, it can be run 
to develop understanding of its dynamics and sensitiv-
ity, to compare its behavior to data for the system, and 
to help decide where best to put additional effort in 
improving the model. This can be thought of as an 
initial " scoping" step that facilitates broad-based input 
and consensus. 
Based on this initial "consensus-building" model-
development stage, which focuses on generalism as 
described above, it may be appropriate and desirable 
to move to a more realistic or precise modeling stage. 
This stage could involve more traditional "experts" 
and is more concerned with analyzing the details of 
specific scenarios or policy options. For example, an 
ongoing long-term integrated modeling study of the 
Patuxent River watershed in Maryland (Bockstael et 
al. 1995) has moved into this "policy analysis" stage 
of model development and use. It is still critical to 
maintain stakeholder involvement and interaction in 
this stage with regular workshops and meetings to dis-
cuss model progress and results . 
While integrated models aimed at realism and pre-
cision are large, complex, and loaded with uncertainties 
of various kinds (Costanza et al. 1990, Groffman and 
Likens 1994, Bockstael et al. 1995), our abilities to 
understand, communicate, and deal with these uncer-
tainties are rapidly improving. It is also important to 
remember that while increasing the resolution and com-
plexity of models increases the amount we can say 
about a system, it also limits how accurately we can 
say it. Model predictability tends to fall with increasing 
resolution due to compounding uncertainties (Costanza 
and Maxwell 1993). What we are after are models that 
optimize their "effectiveness" (Costanza and Sklar 
1985) by choosing an intermediate resolution where 
the product of predictability and resolution (effective-
ness) is maximized. 
It is also necessary to place the modeling process 
within the larger framework of adaptive management 
(Holling 1978) if it is to be effective. We need to view 
the implementation of policy prescriptions in a differ-
ent, more adaptive way that acknowledges the uncer-
tainty embedded in our models and allows participation 
by all the various stakeholder groups. "Adaptive man-
agement" views regional development policy and man-
agement as "experiments," where interventions at sev-
eral scales are made to achieve understanding and to 
identify and test policy options (Holling 1978, Walters 
1986, Lee 1993, Gunderson et al. 1995). This means 
that models and policies based on them are not taken 
as the ultimate answers , but rather as guiding an adap-
tive experimentation process with the regional system. 
More emphasis is placed on monitoring and feedback 
to check and improve the model, rather than using the 
model to obfuscate and defend a policy that is not 
corresponding to reality. Continuing stakeholder in-
volvement is essential in adaptive management. 
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